Note: The author served as a fire direction specialist with the 1/161 Field Artillery, KsArNG, before being commissioned as a Second Lieutenant, Infantry. He has nearly eleven years of service, including 220th MP Company and 5/19th Special Forces (CoArNG), Mortar Platoon Leader, and assistant Battalion S-2 (Military Intelligence Officer) with 3/87th Infantry (USAR). He is veteran of Panama, Guatemala, and Desert Storm. His Infantry specialties include Tactical Intelligence, Counter-Terrorism, Low Intensity Conflict, and Special Operations. He has been a weapons instructor and rangemaster for both military training and civilian law enforcement training.

"The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger". Sun Tzu

War has been with us since Cain and Able. Some anthropologists would argue that the very nature of man is that of a warrior and that even his physical characteristics predispose him to hunt and to fight. There seems to be a consensus that violence, while generally deplorable, is nevertheless at times necessary to preserve society. When such time occurs that violence must be employed, then the question must be answered concerning the extent and duration of its employment. This question must be answered in the full light of reason and moral principle or the force applied becomes illegitimate and corrupted. This is the question that continues to surface regarding the Vietnam War, twenty-five years after the fact.

One could debate the morality of war in any context but it would be hard to dodge the realty that soldiers fight more diligently when they are convinced of the "rightness" of their action. One of the reasons for military "successes" of some terrorist organizations lies in the fact that they are ideologically committed to the battle. "The long-term aims of political terrorism are dependent upon the terrorists’ ideology which may be anything from neo-fascism and racism to neo-Marxism and anarchism". In our Vietnam experience, men and women were asked to commit their lives in defense of our nation against Communism. Their belief in "God and Country" was the moral leverage that the government used to initiate and perpetuate the war in Southeast Asia. If it be conceded that military force is the appropriate mechanism to fight this particular enemy, then it would seem entirely consistent that the government which initiates military action would commit itself fully to the successful conclusion of that process. For a nation to lure its warriors into battle under a pretext of morality, and then abandon them utterly, is perhaps the greatest breach of justice imaginable.

Foreign Policy, always a gambler’s nightmare, is even more risky when engaged in the absence of any moral legitimacy. With the benefit of perfect hindsight, it is likely that America’s first major policy blunder was in its failure to properly assess Ho Chi Minh’s nationalist intentions. Few people know that Ho Chi Minh was probably the best bet during the 1940s, for an independent Vietnam. "The OSS (precursor to the CIA) quoted Ho as saying that ‘although he formerly favored Communist ideals, he now realized that such ideals were impracticable for his country, and that his policy now was one of republican nationalism’". Because the U.S. turned away from Ho Chi Minh’s pleas for recognition and, instead, listened to the French (for whom Vietnam had already been a foreign policy disaster), Ho was forced into the hard-core communist camp. This was probably the original "sin" of American policy in Vietnam.

American global policy during the cold war years (1950s and ‘60s) became one of attempting to orchestrate free elections in politically agitated countries and to restricting the use of combat forces as much as possible. In South Vietnam, however, Premier Ngo Dinh Diem not only was allowed to avoid free elections, but the U.S. further departed from policy by directly supplying the Diem Regime with economic and military assistance. Many top military advisors in America argued against this approach but the growing spectre of communism seemed to argue more persuasively. The U.S. government deviated from a foreign policy position which had been established within some framework of "morality". Thus rejecting a "moral" underpinning, America committed the second "sin" in Southeast Asia.

Diem, although far from a perfect leader, seemed the best available choice for leading the country back to some kind of stability. "Diem was by far the ablest of the Vietnam leaders and he had the great merit of being a civilian. Lyndon Johnson, then vice-president, termed him with some exaggeration ‘the Churchill of Southeast Asia’".

Nevertheless, the Kennedy administration was concerned about Diem’s brother-in-law, Ngo Dinh Nhu, now head of the secret police, whose threats of a military purge were signaling the possibility of a coup attempt. Through the CIA, the Kennedy administration was sending messages of support to both sides (Diem and the military generals) and clearly, from the evidence now available, fully cooperated with the overthrow of Diem’s government and the resulting assassinations of Diem and Nhu. "It duly took place on 01 November (1963), Diem being murdered and the CIA providing $42,000.00 in bribes for the soldiers who set up a military junta. This was America’s third great sin: ‘The worst mistake we ever made’, as Lyndon Johnson put it. Three weeks later, Kennedy himself was murdered and Johnson was president".

While it is well beyond the scope of this paper to examine all of the causes of war, one component of what compels some citizens to risk everything on the battlefield is tied to their belief in the "moral desirability" of their effort. The soldier may be motivated to extreme examples of heroism by the two-fold expectation that what he does is "good" and that it will be accepted as such by "the folks back home". Henry Cabot Lodge served as Ambassador to Vietnam under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and saw clearly that, regardless of what went on behind the scenes, "...The U.S. Government had to be morally accountable to the world at large. There first had to be an equivalent and demonstrable South Vietnamese effort against the North. Then, he said, ‘ We would be in a very strong position with regard to U.S. public opinion, the Congress, and the United Nations’".

Perhaps the greatest evil that a government may perpetrate upon the people is to create a situation where its citizens are fraudulently motivated to offer the ultimate sacrifice for a cause that is, at best, a moral uncertainty. One may argue at great length the merits or necessities of the Vietnam War, but no one will deny that the American public lost its taste for that war many years and several thousand men earlier than 1975. More than two and a half centuries ago Sun Tzu observed, " If the victory is long in coming, the men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be dampened. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength, and if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the state will not be equal to the strain." Any national foreign policy which relies on military intervention but ignores these principles, is unwise indeed.

The prosecution of a war is the proper domain of the nation’s military leaders, not the politicians. To be sure, a civilian commander-in-Chief may be a good way to balance the power in our federal republic, but the use of military forces for anything less than all-out war is ill-advised. The war in Vietnam demonstrated graphically that the will to stay and fight is a force superior to tanks and airplanes and political rhetoric. "Unlike the Americans, the North Vietnamese leaders never once wavered in their determination to secure their political aim- total domination of the entire country- at any cost".

Bruce Lawler was a CIA Case Officer in Vietnam from November, 1971 to December, 1973. When interviewed later he said, "...The essential ingredient is missing, and that’s the dedication and will and enthusiasm, and that’s got to be instilled in the troops by their leaders. I don’t think it was instilled in the ARVN, I don’t think it was instilled in the Americans, and I don’t think it was instilled in the Agency. I think we all gave up".

What caused the Americans to lose their will to fight? The biggest reason, according to the soldiers, the pilots, and the nurses who were there, was the betrayal they felt at the hands of the people and the government of the United States. The press vilified them, their families often rejected them, the people they were trying to help hated them and turned against them. With all of that, however, the most often articulated complaint of the military personnel was the way in which they were hamstrung by our own politicians.

Ground tactics were often absurd. Infantry was used to draw the fire of the hidden enemy, causing them to expose themselves. Standard tactical response to ambush was for the squad or platoon being ambushed to return automatic fire indiscriminately in the general direction of the attack. Then the ground troops would radio for air or artillery support so that U.S. high-tech weapons of mass destruction could be brought to bear on the enemy. But the enemy was a handful of guerrillas who could ambush and then disappear in the jungle before the planes could unload their ordnance. This display of American military superiority resulted in an expenditure of over 4,000 rounds and 1200 pounds of high explosive ordnance for every confirmed Viet Cong soldier killed. If the war effort is perceived by the combatants to be a game, it is difficult indeed for leaders to maintain morale. The Rules of Engagement were part of the "politics" of the game. Al Santoli, a rifleman with the 25th Infantry Division, said, "We had pretty well wiped the main force VC in our area and had the NVA beat after Tet. We chased them as far as Cambodia and had to stop at the border, which allowed them to regroup. This cat-and-mouse game went on for ten years". Kit Lavell was a pilot with U.S. Navy Light Attack Squadron 4 from August of 1971 through April 1972. He reported similar frustrations with the politics of war. "I couldn’t get clearances from anybody and it was a holiday, Christmas or whatever, and the ARVNs were literally getting their asses kicked. I couldn’t get clearances from anybody. I took it upon myself to put an air strike in. I just went ahead and did it. It was bad weather and we took a lot of fire, but we saved the guys from being overrun. We got back to Squadron and the skipper was talking about writing us up for some kind of commendation, and the next word I heard was they were going to ask us to go to Saigon and explain why we shouldn’t be court-martialed for breaking the Rules of Engagement".

This frustration was shared by military personnel in all the branches of the military in Vietnam. Speaking of the Christmas Truce of 1965, Naval aviators reflected on the halt in bombing operations with similar disdain. The Johnson administration had hoped that "Operation Rolling Thunder" the massive bombing begun in late 1965, would have had the effect of bringing Hanoi to the negotiation table. While it halted for 37 days in December 1965/January 1966, the bombing respite only allowed the North an opportunity to reconstruct bridges and re-arm themselves for the next phase of the war. Particularly, they intensified the air defense network of missiles and anti-aircraft batteries between Hanoi and China. "The Johnson administration had to face the sobering and disheartening fact that the efforts of the previous year had been in vain. Rolling Thunder, phase I, had been a dismal failure in its main objective, bringing the Communists around. The men and aircraft lost during 1965 strikes had been wasted".

Washington would dictate when and where bombing targets could be attacked because of the public relations angle being constantly played in the press. "The port of Cam Pha, an important North Vietnamese coal depot, could not be attacked when there were any foreign ships in the harbor. Naturally the North took advantage of this ruling and it was a rare day when a foreign ship was not tied up to a pier at Cam Pha".

As incredible as it may be, the rules of engagement dictated that the act of returning fire on a hostile enemy required permission from higher headquarters. It is an affront to reason that military men in combat must secure permission to do the job they have been trained to do- engage the enemy. "The frustration of the men who risked their lives daily entering the intense corridors of flak and SAMs can be imagined, as they fought not only the enemy on the ground, but also the so-called rules of engagement laid down by their government. Even when ships in the harbors opened up with 37mm fire, the Navy pilots were strictly admonished not to fire back".

Senior military officials in all branches of the services felt that the Johnson administration was working counter to the general prosecution of the war. Surveillance photos clearly showed enemy build-up every time pressure from the bombing was relived . Further evidence was supplied by the ground troops who experienced greater casualties after cease-fires and bombing halts. Said Al Santoli, "I was in the field when (President) Johnson halted the bombing. We were angry in the field because we knew what would happen- the stepping up of enemy supplies. We started getting rocketed more. The shit hit the fan whenever they stopped bombing. It wasn’t the NVA that beat us, it was our own politicians".

I. To avoid a quagmire like Vietnam in the future, America’s Foreign policy strategy must be developed in strict accordance with fundamental, historic national objectives yet remain flexible enough to deal with global changes. Sun Tzu said that to know oneself and to know ones enemies, one need not fear the result of a hundred battles. There are two component parts to this observation. The first is that our nation needs to reexamine our own foundations and recommit to our fundamental principles. We need to fully understand ourselves and why we believe what we believe. Next, it is critical to study and experience the people and the cultures of the rest of the world. There is a desperate need for persons serving in the State Department who have a high degree of experience, as well as extensive study, in other cultures and beliefs.

It is easily argued that Ho Chi Minh was scarcely the enemy in 1945 that he was portrayed to be in 1953 and later. By having a better sense global perspective, and relying more on the agents who had extensive experience dealing directly with Ho, leadership in Vietnam likely have been consolidated and the entire region would have been strengthened. Failure to view Ho Chi Minh except through the very narrow lenses of Washington politics, distorted our policy. Once distorted, it was a small step to the slippery slope of political manipulation through kidnapping, assassination, and terror. Once the moral foundation for government policy has eroded, it is difficult to convince the world that we have moral legitimacy to be anywhere.

II. Lying, cheating and stealing are nearly universally accepted as bad conduct if not outright immoral. Even outside the framework of organized religion, most people would agree that this behavior is destructive to relationships. How can a nation employ such tactics as an extension of foreign policy and expect that there will be no consequences? "Righteousness exhalts a nation: but sin is a reproach to any people", we are told in Proverbs 14:34. One need not be a theologian to appreciate the wisdom of that short sentence. History is full of examples that when a nation deals shamelessly with another nation, it suffers calamitous consequences. Our own American War for Independence would not have occurred if King George of England had not adopted such an imperious attitude toward his subjects. A cursory view of the fall of every great civilization of the past seems to suggest that moral decay, if not the cause, was at least a key player in their demise.

III. The use of the military for anything other than declared war must be studiously avoided. The greatest political tool that is available to any government is the power of the faith that a people have in their government. This is the cornerstone of the codes of conduct for all of the armed services of the United States. The Army Officers Guide is one such example which gives some perspective to source of this power and its proper application. "The military code is a standard of action with much depth. It is a firm belief that the preservation of our nation is decidedly worthwhile. It is unswerving confidence in the loyalty of our people and their sons and daughters who wear their country’s uniform. It is a solid conviction that the courses followed by our government are sound and just to all people everywhere. It is faith".

The Army Officer’s Manual goes on to describe the "keystone of the code of the Army Officer" as an officer of the executive branch of the federal government. As such, he or she is expected to faithfully execute the orders of the president "never divulging that they have doubts or that they have ever had doubts as to its wisdom". This is the precise reason why this author is no longer an Officer of the United States armed services. It is critical for the officers and soldiers to have full faith and allegiance in order to be utterly reliable in the gravest extreme. Yet, the privilege of questioning authority must be forsaken in order to serve the military needs of the country. Although fully understood and appreciated, the truth of this matter is a difficult dilemma to solve for many individuals. The nation needs loyal soldiers, yet government leaders can ill afford to spend that loyalty so frivolously as it has in the past. For this author, the dilemma was finally resolved by resigning a commission as Captain and then pursuing a career in law and government.

The Army Officer’s Manual suggests that times have changed and that the soldier must be prepared to change his role to accommodate this policy shift. "Now we must work and fight, and some must die, without the formal declaration of war; and a case can be made that these deaths may occur without the understanding and national acclaim that our citizens extend to the soldier dead in a conventional war. This is the world we live in today". This acquiescence to change is where we must part ways on the issue of obedience, for it begins to work at cross-purposes with all of the principles articulated above. If our political leadership departs from a moral foundation (which is not arbitrary nor speculative, but can be readily discerned by even a casual reading of history) then it is the duty and responsibility of the people- all the people- to hold the line against such erosion of principle.

The Manual claims that the essential attribute of the Army and its members is "integrity". Yet how can this term be defined so as to deny the clear meaning of the Constitution while embracing the modern, politically popular concept of the soldier as an international peacekeeper placed under the command of foreign generals and committed to fight and die for another nation than the one to whom his allegiance was sworn? It cannot be so construed!

If America is to regain its position of international leadership and influence, it must forsake the illegitimate use of the military as international "policemen". The soldiers, seamen, and airmen must be absolutely convinced that their nation will call upon them only in the gravest extreme and that America will give them a heroes welcome when they return. Political leadership, once committed to a military solution, must step aside and let the military do what they are trained and equipped to do.

Posted on the Internet on 10 March 1999

Email the author at johnster@erols.com